Abstract-We propose a notion of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme with timed-release encryption (TRE) mechanism, timed-release hierarchical identity-based encryption (TRHIBE), and define its security models. We also show a generic construction of TRHIBE from HIBE and one-time signature, and discuss the security of the constructed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION Timed-release encryption (TRE) [1] [2] [3] [4]
is an encryption mechanism that allows a receiver to decrypt a ciphertext only after the time that a sender designates.
Timed-release identity-based encryption (TRIBE) [6] is an extension of TRE having a function of identity-based encryption (IBE). In TRIBE, even a legitimate receiver cannot decrypt a ciphertext using secret key until the time designated by the sender. A TRIBE system consists of a key generation center (KGC), a time server (TS), senders and receivers. A sender encrypts a message using an identity of a receiver and a time after which the ciphertext could be decrypted. The KGC generates a secret key corresponding to an identity of a receiver. The TS periodically broadcasts a time signal corresponding to the current time. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext using the secret key and the time signal corresponding to the time designated by the sender. TRIBE systems use identity of user as his/her public key. TRIBE has an advantage that it does not require linking public keys to identity such as PKI.
Timed-release hierarchical identity-based encryption (TRHIBE) is another extension of TRE having a function of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). In TRHIBE, even a legitimate receiver cannot decrypt a ciphertext using secret key until a time designated by a sender. A TRHIBE system consists of senders, multiple KGCs, a single TS, and receivers. The KGCs and users have a hierarchical structure in which each KGC generates a secret key corresponding to an identity of a child KGC or a child user. Therefore, the load of derivation of users secret keys can be distributed to multiple KGCs. A sender encrypts a message using an identity of a receiver and a time. The TS periodically broadcasts a time signal corresponding to the current time. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext using the secret key and the time signal corresponding to the time designated by the sender.
II. RELATED WORKS
In TRIBE, a user can decrypt a ciphertext only when the user has the receiver's secret key and the time signal generated by TS. Then, if the receiver does not have the time signal or the TS does not have the secret key, they cannot decrypt the ciphertext. In [6] , two security models of TRIBE are defined. One is security against malicious receiver, IND-ID-CCA CR security. The other is security against malicious TS, IND-ID-CCA TS security. A generic construction of TRIBE that achieves the security is also shown in [6] . It is a combination of two IBE schemes and a one-time signature scheme, based on "Parallel Encryption" by Dodis-Katz [7] , and the security is proved in the standard model.
III. CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we introduce timed-release hierarchical identity-based encryption (TRHIBE) and define two security models. One is security against malicious receiver, IND-hID-CCA CR security. The other is security against malicious TS, IND-hID-CCA TS security. We also present a generic construction of TRHIBE. It is a combination of two HIBE schemes and a one-time signature scheme, also based on "Parallel Encryption". We see that if the primitive HIBE schemes are IND-hID-CCA secure and the primitive one-time signature scheme is OT-sEUF-CMA secure, then the constructed TRHIBE scheme is IND-hID-CCA CR secure and IND-hID-CCA TS secure in the standard model.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) and one-time signature, which we use later.
A. Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption
In an HIBE scheme, the single KGC functionality of generating secret keys is divided into partial ones and they are delegated to multiple KGCs. If a KGC is assigned an identity vector, 
We review a standard security notion for HIBE: indistinguishability against adaptive hierarchical identity and chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-hID-CCA) security [8] [9] . We here describe the IND-hID-CCA security for HIBE scheme HIBE based on the following IND-hID-CCA game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs (params, msk ) ← HIBE.Setup(λ, ℓ). C sends params to A and keeps msk secret.
Phase1
A 
Phase2
A can adaptively issue extraction queries ID and decryption queries (ID, c) in the same way as in Phase1 except that the extraction queries ID must differ from the challenge identity ID * and its prefixes, and decryption queries (ID, c) must differ from the pair (ID * , c * ).
Guess
A outputs a guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if b = b ′ .
We define an advantage of A in the IND-hID-CCA game as Adv
, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the HIBE scheme HIBE is IND-hID-CCA secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
B. Signature
Let λ be a security parameter. A signature scheme SIG consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms SIG = (SigGen, Sign, Verify). The key generation algorithm SigGen takes λ as input, and outputs a signing key sk and a verification key vk . The signing algorithm Sign takes sk and a message m as inputs , and outputs a signature σ. The verification algorithm Verify takes vk , a message m, and a signature σ as inputs, and outputs accept or reject. These algorithms are assumed to satisfy that if (sk , vk ) = SigGen(λ) then Verify(vk , m, Sign(sk , m)) = accept for any m.
1)
OT-sEUF-CMA Security: We review a security notion for one-time signature scheme: one-time strong existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (OT-sEUF-CMA) security [10] . We here describe the OT-sEUF-CMA security for signature scheme SIG based on the following OT-sEUF-CMA game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs the (sk, vk) ← SigGen(λ). C sends vk to A and keeps sk secret.
Query
A can issue a signing query m to C only once. C responds to the singing query m by running σ = Sign(vk , m) and returning σ to A.
Forge
A outputs a pair (m * , σ * ).
We define the advantage of A in the OT-sEUF-CMA game as Adv
, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the signature scheme SIG is OT-sEUF-CMA secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
V. TIMED-RELEASE HIERARCHICAL IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION(TRHIBE)
In this section, we introduce timed-release hierarchical identity-based encryption(TRHIBE) scheme and define its security models.
A TRHIBE system consists of a single TS, multiple KGCs and multiple users connected through a communication network. The time server periodically broadcasts a time signal corresponding to the current time, and all users can receive the time signal. The single KGC functionality of generating secret keys is divided into partial ones and they are delegated to multiple KGCs. If a KGC is assigned an identity vector,
, and given a secret key, d ID (k−1) , corresponding to the identity vector, then it can generate a secret key, d ID (k) , corresponding to an identity vector, ID (k) = (I 1 , ..., I k−1 , I k ). We may denote an identity by ID if we need not to specify its hierarchy depth. A user (sender) encrypts a plaintext, designating another user (receiver) who can decrypt the ciphertext and a time only after which the ciphertext can be decrypted. The receiver can decrypt the ciphertext with the www.ijacsa.thesai.orgsecret key that he/she has and the time signal that the time server broadcasts at the designated time.
Let λ be a security parameter and ℓ be a maximum depth of system. An timed-release hierarchical identitybased encryption scheme T RHIBE consists of seven probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms T RHIBE=(TS Setup, KGC Setup, Release, Extract, Delegate, Encrypt, Decrypt). The time server's setup algorithm TS Setup takes λ as input, and outputs a public key tpk and the corresponding secret key tsk . The key generation center's setup algorithm KGC Setup takes λ and the depth ℓ as input, and outputs a public parameter params and a master secret key msk . The release algorithm Release takes tpk , tsk and a time period T as inputs, and outputs a time signal d T . The extract algorithm Extract takes params, msk , and an identity ID 
A. Security
We can consider security against malicious TS and security against malicious receiver.
1) IND-hID-CCA TS Security.: We introduce a security notion for TRHIBE: indistinguishability against adaptive hierarchical identity and chosen ciphertext attacks by timeservers (IND-hID-CCA TS ) security.
This security ensures that a malicious time server, who has a secret key tsk , cannot obtain any information of message from ciphertext without decryption key d ID . We here describe the IND-hID-CCA TS security for a TRHIBE scheme T RHIBE based on the following IND-hID-CCA TS game between a challenger C and adversary A.
Setup
C runs (tpk, tsk) ← TS Setup(λ) and (params, msk) ← KGC Setup(λ, ℓ). C sends tpk , tsk and params to A and keeps msk secret.
Phase1
A can adaptively issue extraction queries ID and decryption queries (T, ID, c We define an advantage of A in the IND-hID-CCA TS game as Adv
, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the TRIBE scheme T RHIBE is IND-hID-CCA TS secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
2) IND-hID-CCA CR Security.: We introduce another security notion for TRIBE: indistinguishability against adaptive hierarchical identity and chosen ciphertext attacks by curious receiver (IND-hID-CCA CR ) security. This security ensures that a receiver who has a decryption key d ID cannot obtain any information of message from ciphertext without time signal d T . We here describe the IND-hID-CCA CR security for a TRIBE scheme T RHIBE based on the following IND-hID-CCA CR game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup
C runs (tpk , tsk ) ← TS Setup(λ) and (params, msk ) ← KGC Setup(λ, ℓ). C sends params, msk and tpk to A and keeps tsk secret.
Phase1
A can adaptively issue release queries T and decryption queries (T, ID, c). C responds to a release query T by running d T = Release(tpk , tsk , T ) and returning d T to A. C responds to a decryption query (T , ID, c) by www.ijacsa.thesai.org
We define an advantage of A in the IND-hID-CCA CR game as Adv
, in which the probability is taken over the random coins used by C and A. We say that the TRIBE scheme T RHIBE is IND-hID-CCA CR secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, the function Adv
VI. CONSTRUCTION OF TRHIBE
Here we present a generic construction of TRHIBE scheme from two HIBE schemes, and a one-time signature scheme.
A. Construction
Let Π = (HIBE. Setup A TRHIBE scheme Γ = (TS Setup, KGC Setup, Release, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt) is constructed as follows.
Time server setup TS Setup(λ):
Step 1: Run HIBE.Setup(λ, 1) to generate (params, msk ).
Step 2: Set tpk = params and tsk = msk .
Step 3: Return (tpk , tsk ).
Key generation center setup KGC Setup(λ, ℓ):
Step 1: Run HIBE ′ .Setup(λ, ℓ) to generate (params, msk ).
Step 2: Return (params, msk ).
Release Release(tpk , tsk , T ):
Step 1: Run HIBE.Ext(tpk , tsk , T ) to obtain d T .
Step 2: Return d T .
Extraction Extract(params, msk , ID):
Step 1: Run HIBE ′ .Ext(params, msk , ID) to obtain d IDj .
Step 2: Return d IDj .
Delegate(params, ID
Step 2: Return d ID (k+1) .
Encryption Encrypt(tpk , params, m, T, ID):
Step 1: Run SigGen(λ) to generate (sk , vk ).
Step 2: Randomly choose s 1 ∈ {0, 1} |m| .
Step 3: Compute s 2 = m ⊕ s 1 .
Step 4: Compute c 1 = HIBE.Enc(tpk , s 1 ||vk, T ).
Step 5: Compute c 2 = HIBE ′ .Enc(params, s 2 ||vk, ID).
Step 6: Compute σ = Sign(sk , c 1 ||c 2 ||T ||ID).
Step 7: Set c = (c 1 , c 2 , T, ID, vk, σ).
Step 8: Return c.
Step 1: Parse c as c = (c 1 , c 2 , T, ID, vk, σ).
Step 2: If Verify(vk , c 1 ||c 2 ||T ||ID, σ)= reject then return ⊥ and stop.
Step 
′ is an IND-hID-CCA secure hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme and Σ is a OT-sEUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme, then Γ is an INDhID-CCA TS secure timed-release hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme.
Proof(Theorem 1)
Suppose A is an adversary that breaks the IND-hID-CCA TS security of Γ. We construct a simulator B which breaks the IND-hID-CCA security of the HIBE scheme Proof(Claim 1) We assume Forge occurs. Then, we construct a forger F who breaks OT-sEUF-CMA security of the onetime signature scheme Σ, from A. The description of F is as follows.
Setup
F receives vk * from C. Then F runs (tpk , tsk ) ← TS Setup(λ) and (params, msk ) ← KGC Setup(λ, ℓ). F sends tpk , tsk and params to A and keeps msk . 
Query

